How I Am Not a Kantian

Abstract

Abstract This chapter talks about the book's vigorous defense of a cognitivist and value-based account of reasons and its ending with the claim of a convergence between Kantian, consequentialist, and contractualist moral theories. This chapter comments on the relation between these two parts of the book. Questions about reasons are fundamental to the book's conclusion because the theories for which convergence is in question characterise right and wrong in terms of what people have reason to want, or could rationally do. The three theories the book considers are: Immanuel Kant's Contractualist Formula, Thomas M. Scanlon's Formula, and Kant's Rule Consequentialism. This chapter examines how the theories laid out by this text differ from Kant's and considers Kant's notions of rationality and morality by focusing on his Formula of Universal Law. It also tackles Kant's discussion of the Formula of Universal Law in his Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals.

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