Article1990

ATTENDANCE RATES, POLITICAL SHIRKING, AND THE EFFECT OF POST‐ELECTIVE OFFICE EMPLOYMENT

89 citations0/0 files storedEconomic Inquiry

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Electoral Systems and Political Participation Fiscal Policies and Political Economy Political Influence and Corporate Strategies

Abstract

Most economists agree that opportunistic behavior by politicians is limited by the threat of reelection. By implication, the level of shirking should be the greatest when a politician decides to leave office. This paper seeks to learn whether shirking can be reduced when opportunities exist for political parties andlor constituencies to fnfect a shirking politician's post‐elective career or the careers of his children. Shirking is found to be completely eliminated only in the case where both the retiring congressman and his offspring continue to be employed in government andlor lobbying fnter the congressman leaves elective office.

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References

1986Incumbent performance and electoral control 1974Law Enforcement, Malfeasance, and Compensation of Enforcers 1973The control of politicians: An economic model 1977Congress: Keystone of the Washington Establishment 1987The Personal Vote 1975The Independent Judiciary in an Interest-Group Perspective 1984Constituent Interest and Congressional Voting 1975The Independent Judiciary in an Interest-Group Perspective

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1989Shirking and sorting in a political market with finite-lived politicians 1992A critical review and an extension of the political shirking literature 2015Drawing Your Senator from a Jar:Term Length and Legislative Behavior 1994Unfastening the Electoral Connection: The Behavior of U.S. Representatives when Reelection Is No Longer a Factor 2020Gerontocracy in a comparative perspective: Explaining why political leaders are (almost always) older than their constituents

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