The Value of Vagueness: Delegation, Defiance, and Judicial OpinionsJeffrey K. Staton, Georg Vanberg2007-01-01preprintSSRN Electronic Journal123 citationsgreenNo readable copy stored yet — this record is metadata only.Judicial and Constitutional StudiesAmerican Constitutional Law and PoliticsLaw, Economics, and Judicial SystemsAbstractNo abstract was published for this record.Citations in this libraryStored only when both papers are in the corpus — 123 citations exist upstream.References1987Administrative Procedures as Instruments of Political Control1999Delegating Powers1992The Hollow Hope: Can Courts Bring about Social Change?2000Delegating powers: a transaction cost politics approach to policy making under separate powers2003Deliberate discretion?: the institutional foundations of bureaucratic autonomy2002Deliberate Discretion?1997The choices justices make1991The Dynamics of Political Control of the BureaucracyCited by2012International Organizations and Government Killing: Does Naming and Shaming Save Lives?2011The Political Costs of Crisis Bargaining: Presidential Rhetoric and the Role of Party2010Rule Creation in a Political Hierarchy2011The New Judicial Politics of Legal Doctrine2016Speaking Law to Power: The Strategic Use of Precedent of the Court of Justice of the European Union2012Complying with EU directives' requirements: the link between EU decision-making and the correct transposition of EU provisions2012Compliance: Conceptualizing, Measuring, and Explaining Adherence to Judicial Rulings2014The (Dis)Advantage of Certainty: The Importance of Certainty in Language