Simultaneous Ascending Auctions

Peter Cramton

62 citations0/0 files storedWiley Encyclopedia of Operations Research and Management Science

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Auction Theory and Applications Art History and Market Analysis Game Theory and Voting Systems

Abstract

Abstract The simultaneous ascending auction has proved to be a successful method of auctioning many related items. Simultaneous sale and ascending bids enable price discovery, which helps bidders build desirable packages of items. Although package bids are not allowed, the auction format does handle mild complementarities well. The auction design and its performance in practice are examined.

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1982A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding 2004Putting Auction Theory to Work 2005Combinatorial Auctions 2014Demand Reduction and Inefficiency in Multi-Unit Auctions 2000Putting Auction Theory to Work: The Simultaneous Ascending Auction 2002Ascending Auctions with Package Bidding 1996Analyzing the Airwaves Auction 1997The FCC Spectrum Auctions: An Early Assessment

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2007Learning payoff functions in infinite games 2005Combinatorial auctions for electronic business 2008Foundations of mechanism design: A tutorial Part 1-Key concepts and classical results

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