Prime Numbers: Anchoring and its Implications for Theories of Behavior Priming

Abstract

Subtle primes can influence behavior, often in ways that seem irrational. Anchoring provides a compelling illustration of this: judgments can be influenced by anchors even when the anchors are known to be irrelevant and uninformative. In this article, we selectively examine the anchoring literature in order to evaluate a theoretical framework which has been employed to interpret many social and other priming effects. In this framework, primes are assumed to have broad effects, influencing a wide range of possible downstream behaviors, and these influences are largely automatic. The anchoring literature supports neither of these hypotheses. Anchors have narrow effects on behavior with little transfer across judgments, these effects can be controlled, and deliberate engagement with the anchor is a prerequisite for obtaining influences on later judgments. We question whether priming studies reveal evidence for the sort of automatic and consequential mental processes that are commonly proposed.

Cite this work

No public copy is stored for this record, so only the metadata is cited.

Stored only when both papers are in the corpus — 39 citations exist upstream.

Papers that cite the same references — the relational fallback while embeddings are still backfilling.