References

• 1976Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure71,441 cited
• 1983Separation of Ownership and Control19,446 cited
• 1986Agency Costs of Free Cash Flow, Corporate Finance, and Takeovers17,216 cited
• 1980Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm10,540 cited
• 1933The Modern Corporation and Private Property7,361 cited
• 1985The Structure of Corporate Ownership: Causes and Consequences6,243 cited
• 1983The market for corporate control4,145 cited
• 1986The Hubris Hypothesis of Corporate Takeovers3,764 cited
• 1984Two Agency-Cost Explanations of Dividends3,109 cited
• 1965Mergers and the Market for Corporate Control2,364 cited
• 1991Corporate Structure, Liquidity, and Investment: Evidence from Japanese Industrial Groups2,361 cited
• 1988Compensation and Incentives: Practice vs. Theory1,719 cited
• 1988Takeover Threats and Managerial Myopia1,670 cited
• 1999Eclipse of the Public Corporation1,656 cited
• 1933The Modern Corporation and Private Property1,557 cited
• 1983The Market Mechanism as an Incentive Scheme