Taxes and Bribery: The Role of Wage Incentives

Timothy J. Besley · John McLaren

582 citations0/0 files storedThe Economic Journal

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Taxation and Compliance Studies Economic and Fiscal Studies Corruption and Economic Development

Abstract

Timothy Besley, John McLaren; Taxes and Bribery: The Role of Wage Incentives, The Economic Journal, Volume 103, Issue 416, 1 January 1993, Pages 119–141, https:

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References

1970Political Order in Changing Societies 1972Income tax evasion: a theoretical analysis 1986The Nash Bargaining Solution in Economic Modelling 1994Monotone Comparative Statics 1979Axiomatic Models of Bargaining 1985A Theory of Dual Labor Markets with Application to Industrial Policy, Discrimination and Keynesian Unemployment 1986Introduction

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