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Optimal international trade agreements and dispute settlement procedures · Study

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ArticleOptimal international trade agreements and dispute settlement procedures

Rodney D. Ludema2001

Article2001

Optimal international trade agreements and dispute settlement procedures

Rodney D. Ludema

93 citations·0/0 files stored·European Journal of Political Economy

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Global trade and economics World Trade Organization Law Game Theory and Applications

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References

1986The Folk Theorem in Repeated Games with Discounting or with Incomplete Information 1974Subjectivity and correlation in randomized strategies 1988On the Theory of Infinitely Repeated Games with Discounting n.d.An Economic Theory of GATT 1953Optimum Tariffs and Retaliation 1989Renegotiation in repeated games 1973Optimum Tariffs and Retaliation 1999The Role of Multilateral Institutions in International Trade Cooperation

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2018The impact of economic sanctions on international trade: How do threatened sanctions compare with imposed sanctions?2003Global and political strategies in deregulated industries: the asymmetric behaviors of former monopolies 2002The Economics of Trade Disputes, the GATT’s Article XXIII, and the WTO’s Dispute Settlement Understanding 2000International trade agreements between countries of asymmetric size 2008Tariff retaliation versus financial compensation in the enforcement of international trade agreements

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1995Chapter 29 International rules and institutions for trade policychapter · 8 shared references 2009Tariff wars in the Ricardian Model with a continuum of goodsarticle · 7 shared references 2002Trade Policy, Cross-Border Externalities and Lobbies: Do Linked Agreements Enforce More Cooperative Outcomes?preprint · 7 shared references 2006The GATT and gradualismarticle · 6 shared references 2005Stable Tariffs and Retaliations*article · 6 shared references 2011A “New Trade” Theory of GATT/WTO Negotiationsarticle · 5 shared references

Details

Year2001

Typearticle

Published2001-06-01

VenueEuropean Journal of Political Economy

ISSN-L0176-2680

Languageen

Citations93

Files0 public / 0

ShelfGlobal trade and economics

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doi10.1016/s0176-2680(01)00031-3

openalex_workW2124133079

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2009

Enforcing International Trade Agreements with Imperfect Private Monitoring: Private Trigger Strategies and a Possible Role for the WTO

2011Enforcing International Trade Agreements with Imperfect Private Monitoring

1995Chapter 29 International rules and institutions for trade policy