Major current notions of persuasion depict it as attainable via 2 qualitatively distinct routes: (a) a central or a systematic route in which opinions and attitudes are based on carefully processed arguments in the persuasive message and (b) a peripheral or heuristic route in which they are based on briefly considered heuristics or cues, exogenous to the message. This article offers a single-route reconceptualization that treats these dual routes to persuasion as involving functionally equivalent types of evidence from which persuasive conclusions may be drawn. Previous findings in the dual-process literature are reconsidered in light of this "unimodel," and novel data are presented consistent with its assumptions. Beyond its parsimony and integrative potential, the unimodel offers conceptual, empirical, and practical advantages in the persuasion domain.
Stored only when both papers are in the corpus — 510 citations exist upstream.
Imported from OpenAlex (CC0) — nothing here is generated.