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Optimal design of scoring auctions with multidimensional quality
16 references·2 citing·38 second hop
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References

  • 1981Optimal Auction Design5,938 cited
  • 2011Supermodularity and Complementarity2,138 cited
  • 2001The Theory of Incentives: The Principal-Agent Model2,041 cited
  • 2004Putting Auction Theory to Work1,660 cited
  • 1994Monotone Comparative Statics1,571 cited
  • 1993Design Competition Through Multidimensional Auctions848 cited
  • 1997The Design of Multidimensional Auctions366 cited
  • 1987Auctioning Incentive Contracts359 cited
  • 2003Reinventing the Bazaar: A Natural History of Markets.336 cited
  • 2000An experimental analysis of multi-attribute auctions271 cited
  • 1987Competition for Agency Contracts246 cited
  • 2003An Inverse-Optimization-Based Auction Mechanism to Support a Multiattribute RFQ Process225 cited
  • 2016Awarding Monopoly Franchises224 cited
  • 2010Procurement when price and quality matter201 cited
  • 1992A Composite Cost Function for Multiproduct Firms With An Application to Economies of Scope in Banking199 cited
  • 2005Better, Faster, Cheaper: An Experimental Analysis of a Multiattribute Reverse Auction Mechanism with Restricted Information Feedback

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Cited by

  • 2018Two-Stage Multi-attribute Auction Mechanism for Price Discovery and Winner Determination24 cited
  • 2017Tendering design when price and quality is uncertain21 cited