Uncoupled Dynamics Do Not Lead to Nash Equilibrium

Sergiu Hart A · Andreu Mas‐Colell

360 citations0/0 files storedAmerican Economic Review

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Game Theory and Applications Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies Economic theories and models

Abstract

The following sections are included:The ModelAn Example with a Continuum of StrategiesAn Example with Finitely Many StrategiesDiscussionAppendixReferences

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1998Evolutionary Games and Population Dynamics 2011Evolutionary Game Theory 2000A Simple Adaptive Procedure Leading to Correlated Equilibrium 1998Evolutionary Games and Equilibrium Selection 2016Epistemic Conditions for Nash Equilibrium 1995Epistemic Conditions for Nash Equilibrium 19641. Some Topics in Two-Person Games 2002On the Global Convergence of Stochastic Fictitious Play

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2009Joint Strategy Fictitious Play With Inertia for Potential Games 2008Learning by trial and error 2018Evolutionary Game Theory: A Renaissance 2005Adaptive Heuristics 2006Regret Testing: Learning to Play Nash Equilibrium Without Knowing You Have an Opponent 2005Stochastic uncoupled dynamics and Nash equilibrium 2005Individual Q -Learning in Normal Form Games

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