Conflict, Accommodation, and Bargaining: The Implications of Using Politically Buffered Institutions for Contentious Decision Making

Abstract

One type of new public management reform has been the devolution of services to quasi‐autonomous single purpose governments. This research examines the implications of using a particular type of single purpose government, known as a public authority, in a politically contentious policy setting. Public authorities are generally observed to be highly effective in accomplishing their desired ends in the face of political controversy. However, in examining cases of New York State public authorities siting and developing landfills and incinerators, this research found that they were far less effective than their general purpose government counterparts. The cases suggest that the public authorities created a paradox of power and professionalism. Many public authorities were created to protect professional decision making from political influence, but as a result, they had few resources to bargain in the political process. However, if a public authority had political resources, they had less need to be professional.

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