LEADERSHIP BY EXAMPLE IN THE WEAK‐LINK GAME

Edward J. Cartwright · Joris Gillet · Mark van Vugt

52 citations0/0 files storedEconomic Inquiry

No readable copy stored yet — this record is metadata only.

No open-access location is known for this record yet.

Literature note Cite in a project Citation map

Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies Game Theory and Voting Systems Game Theory and Applications

Abstract

We investigate the effects of leadership in a four‐player weak‐link game. A weak‐link game is a coordination game with multiple Pareto‐ranked Nash equilibria. Because the more efficient equilibria involve a degree of strategic uncertainty groups typically find it difficult to coordinate on more efficient equilibria. We wanted to see whether leadership by example, in the form of one player acting publicly before the rest of the group, could help groups do better. Our results suggest that leadership can increase efficiency but is far from being a guarantee of success. Specifically, in a significant number of groups we observed successful leadership and increased efficiency, but in most groups efficiency was low despite the efforts of leaders. We did not find any difference between voluntary leaders and leaders that are randomly assigned. (JEL C72, H41)

Paper brief

Loading…

Cite this work

Citation unavailable for this work.

BibTeX RIS CSL-JSON

No public copy is stored for this record, so only the metadata is cited.

Citations in this library

Citation map →

Stored only when both papers are in the corpus — 52 citations exist upstream.

References

1999A Theory of Fairness, Competition, and Cooperation 2007z-Tree: Zurich toolbox for ready-made economic experiments 2003Behavioral Game Theory: Experiments in Strategic Interaction 2000Fairness and Retaliation: The Economics of Reciprocity 2003Behavioral Game Theory. Experiments in Strategic Interaction 1993The O-Ring Theory of Economic Development 1995On Players′ Models of Other Players: Theory and Experimental Evidence 1990Tacit coordination games, strategic uncertainty, and coordination failure

Cited by

2015The Big Man Mechanism: how prestige fosters cooperation and creates prosocial leaders 2019A Dual Model of Leadership and Hierarchy: Evolutionary Synthesis 2020From genes to minds to cultures: Evolutionary approaches to leadership 2016A productive clash of cultures: Injecting economics into leadership research 2020Words and deeds – Experimental evidence on leading-by-example 2023Leading-by-example in public goods experiments: What do we know?

Explore the map →

Papers that cite the same references — the relational fallback while embeddings are still backfilling.

Imported from OpenAlex (CC0) — nothing here is generated.