The Debate That Won't Die? Values Incommensurability, Antagonism and Theory Choice

Abstract

In this article, I examine a recent turn in the paradigm debate towards the incommensurability thesis and the proposed possibility of adjudication between theories from different paradigms. In particular, I argue that McKelvey and Baum's views (among others) appear to be based on a desire to reduce paradigmatic pluralism and, in turn, reduce uncertainty about what is the empirically valid view among competing theories. By contrast, I make the case that an incommensurability of values still permeates any attempt to engage in theory-adjudication. Such values, I assert, will stall any attempt to adjudicate between theories from different paradigms. In the face of widespread cognitive bias, confirmation bias and belief perseverance, we cannot, I conclude, hope to deal with this issue in any satisfactory way.

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