The Enforcement of Morals

Abstract

There may be a point in reviewing the controversy occasioned by Lord Justice Devlin's Maccabaean lecture from an American point of vantage. For the Justice's brilliant and original paper has been heatedly attacked as “illiberal.” In the popular sport of classifying all positions on all subjects as either Liberal or Conservative— and the sport is quite as popular in the United States as it is in other countries—there is an intriguing difference between the rules of the game as it is conventionally played on the opposite sides of the Atlantic. In Great Britain, the suggestion that law has a moral content seems to raise theocratic ghosts in many quarters, perhaps in most; and clearly, theocracy is “Conservative.” In the United States, however, it is just the other way around. Every American schoolboy—or at least every American law student—considers Austinian Positivism, and the strict separation of law and morals, to be certain hallmarks of a position labelled “Conservative,” “Rigidly Technical,” “Reactionary,” or worse. And the view of law as an instrument for carrying out the moral purposes of its own tradition, and those of the society it rules, is a familiar touchstone of orthodox “Liberalism.”

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