The convergence of fictitious play in games with strategic complementarities: A Comment

Ulrich Berger

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Game Theory and Applications Game Theory and Voting Systems Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies

Abstract

In a recent article, Hahn [Hahn, S. (2008). The convergence of\nfictitious play in games with strategic complementarities. Economics Letters 99, 2, 304-306] claims to prove convergence of fictitious play in games with strategic complementarities. I show here that the proof is flawed and convergence remains an open question.

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References

1998The Theory of Learning in Games 1990Rationalizability, Learning, and Equilibrium in Games with Strategic Complementarities 1990Nash equilibrium with strategic complementarities 1979Equilibrium Points in Nonzero-Sum n -Person Submodular Games 2004Strategic Learning and its Limits 2002On the Global Convergence of Stochastic Fictitious Play 1991Adaptive and sophisticated learning in normal form games 2005Complementarities and Games: New Developments

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