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Why Organizations Fail: Models and Cases
16 references·2 citing·38 second hop
Why Organizations Fail: Models and Cases (2016)Why Organizations Fail: Models and CasesBeyond Computation: Information Technology, Organizational Transformation and Business Performance (2000)Beyond Computation: Informati…The Provision of Incentives in Firms (1999)The Provision of Incentives i…Formal and Real Authority in Organizations (1997)Formal and Real Authority in …Multitask Principal–Agent Analyses: Incentive Contracts, Asset Ownership, and Job Design (1991)Multitask Principal–Agent Ana…Property Rights and the Nature of the Firm (1990)Property Rights and the Natur…The Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration (1986)The Costs and Benefits of Own…Structural Inertia and Organizational Change (1984)Structural Inertia and Organi…Separation of Ownership and Control (1983)Separation of Ownership and C…Strategic Information Transmission (1982)Strategic Information Transmi…Moral Hazard in Teams (1982)Moral Hazard in TeamsGood News and Bad News: Representation Theorems and Applications (1981)Good News and Bad News: Repre…Moral Hazard and Observability (1979)Moral Hazard and ObservabilityOn the Size Distribution of Business Firms (1978)On the Size Distribution of B…Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure (1976)Theory of the firm: Manageria…Prices vs. Quantities (1974)Prices vs. QuantitiesA BEHAVIORAL MODEL OF RATIONAL CHOICE (1955)A BEHAVIORAL MODEL OF RATIONA…Indulgence and risk-taking behavior of firms: Direct and interactive influences (2022)Indulgence and risk-taking be…Optimal contracts with a risk‐taking agent (2020)Optimal contracts with a risk…The Theory of Syndicates (1968)Essays in the Theory of Risk-Bearing. (1972)Markets and Hierarchies: Analysis and Antitrust Implications. (1976)Financial Intermediation and Delegated Monitoring (1984)Agency Costs, Net Worth, And Business Fluctuations (1988)The Nature of the Firm (1937)Production, Information Costs and Economic Organization (1996)Does function follow organizational form? Evidence from the lending practices of large and small banks (2005)Unbundling Institutions (2005)The Problem of Social Cost (1960)Vertical Integration, Appropriable Rents, and the Competitive Contracting Process (1978)Comparative Economic Organization: The Analysis of Discrete Structural Alternatives (1991)The quality of government (1999)The New Institutional Economics: Taking Stock, Looking Ahead (2000)The choice of organizational form The case of franchising (1987)The Economic Institutions of Capitalism (1987)Fairness and Retaliation: The Economics of Reciprocity (2000)Intrinsic and Extrinsic Motivation (2003)The Strategy of Conflict (1960)Job Market Signaling (1973)Signaling Games and Stable Equilibria (1987)Herd Behavior and Investment (1988)Domestic Political Audiences and the Escalation of International Disputes (1994)CAPITAL ASSET PRICES: A THEORY OF MARKET EQUILIBRIUM UNDER CONDITIONS OF RISK* (1964)The Pricing of Options and Corporate Liabilities (1973)Corporate financing and investment decisions when firms have information that investors do not have (1984)Law and Finance (1998)Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm (1980)Agency Theory: An Assessment and Review (1989)Strategic assets and organizational rent (1993)A Survey of Corporate Governance (1997)General purpose technologies ‘Engines of growth’? (1995)A Behavioral Approach to the Rational Choice Theory of Collective Action Presidential Address, American political Science Association, 1997 (2010)The myopia of learning (1993)Managing Legitimacy: Strategic and Institutional Approaches (1995)Building Better Causal Theories: A Fuzzy Set Approach to Typologies in Organization Research (2011)The Framing of Decisions and the Psychology of Choice (1981)Exploration and Exploitation in Organizational Learning (1991)
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References

  • 1976Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure71,441 cited
  • 1983Separation of Ownership and Control19,446 cited
  • 1955A BEHAVIORAL MODEL OF RATIONAL CHOICE15,851 cited
  • 1986The Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration9,369 cited
  • 1979Moral Hazard and Observability8,358 cited
  • 1984Structural Inertia and Organizational Change7,243 cited
  • 1991Multitask Principal–Agent Analyses: Incentive Contracts, Asset Ownership, and Job Design6,042 cited
  • 1990Property Rights and the Nature of the Firm5,407 cited
  • 1982Moral Hazard in Teams4,992 cited
  • 1982Strategic Information Transmission4,289 cited
  • 1999The Provision of Incentives in Firms3,337 cited
  • 2000Beyond Computation: Information Technology, Organizational Transformation and Business Performance3,326 cited
  • 1978On the Size Distribution of Business Firms3,234 cited
  • 1981Good News and Bad News: Representation Theorems and Applications3,198 cited
  • 1997Formal and Real Authority in Organizations3,119 cited
  • 1974Prices vs. Quantities

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  • 2020Optimal contracts with a risk‐taking agent40 cited
  • 2022Indulgence and risk-taking behavior of firms: Direct and interactive influences27 cited