No open-access location is known for this record yet.
No open-access location is known for this record yet.
Agents are often better informed than the clients who hire them and may exploit this informational advantage.Real-estate agents, who know much more about the housing market than the typical homeowner, are one example.Because real estate agents receive only a small share of the incremental profit when a house sells for a higher value, there is an incentive for them to convince their clients to sell their houses too cheaply and too quickly.We test these predictions by comparing home sales in which real estate agents are hired by others to sell a home to instances in which a real estate agent sells his or her own home.In the former case, the agent has distorted incentives; in the latter case, the agent wants to pursue the first-best.Consistent with the theory, we find homes owned by real estate agents sell for about 3.7 percent more than other houses and stay on the market about 9.5 days longer, even after controlling for a wide range of housing characteristics.Situations in which the agent's informational advantage is larger lead to even greater distortions.
Loading…
Stored only when both papers are in the corpus — 217 citations exist upstream.
Papers that cite the same references — the relational fallback while embeddings are still backfilling.
Imported from OpenAlex (CC0) — nothing here is generated.