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CENTRAL BANK REPUTATION AND THE MONETIZATION OF DEFICITS: THE 1981 ITALIAN MONETARY REFORM

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2013

Monetary Policy and Fiscal Dominance in Italy from the Early 1970s to the Adoption of the Euro: A Review

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1989Exchange rates and seigniorage22 cited

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1998La théorie du policy-mix : un bilan critique14 cited

1988REAGANOMICS AND REPUTATION REVISITED13 cited