Captive Financing Arrangements and Information Asymmetry: The Case of REITs

Abstract

For the sample period of 1985 and 1986, captive real estate investments trusts (REITs) have a larger bid‐ask spread than noncaptive REITs, after controlling for trading volume, price volatility, insider holdings, institutional holdings and firm size. Based on the bid‐ask spread literature, the results suggest that captive firms are subject to a greater degree of information asymmetry. This implies a higher cost of capital for captive firms. The evidence here and the trend toward self‐administered REITs imply that information asymmetry and conflicts of interests within REITs are priced.

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