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Determinants of Chief Executive Officer Compensation
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Determinants of Chief Executive Officer Compensation (1988)Determinants of Chief Executive Officer C…MANAGERIAL CONTROL, PERFORMANCE, AND EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION. (1987)MANAGERIAL CONTROL, PERFORMAN…The theory and practice of econometrics (1986)The theory and practice of ec…The Determinants of Executive Salaries: An Econometric Survey (1980)The Determinants of Executive…Managerial Pay and Corporate Performance (1970)Managerial Pay and Corporate …The Modern Corporation and Private Property (1933)The Modern Corporation and Pr…Labor Market Advantages of Organizational Status: A Study of Lateral Partner Hiring by Large U.S. Law Firms (2014)Labor Market Advantages of Or…Do CEOS Encounter Within-Tenure Settling Up? A Multiperiod Perspective on Executive Pay and Dismissal (2011)Do CEOS Encounter Within-Tenu…Economic and psychological perspectives on CEO compensation: a review and synthesis (2010)Economic and psychological pe…Too Good to be True: Board Structural Independence as a Moderator of CEO Pay-for-Firm-Performance (2009)Too Good to be True: Board St…Contracts and the Market for Executives (2009)Contracts and the Market for …The Value of Human Capital Specificity Versus Transferability (2007)The Value of Human Capital Sp…The Determinants of Employee Compensation in Family Firms: Empirical Evidence (2007)The Determinants of Employee …Ownership, Corporate Governance and Top Management Pay in Hong Kong (2005)Ownership, Corporate Governan…Organizational governance and employee pay: how ownership structure affects the firm's compensation strategy (2005)Organizational governance and…Executive compensation and agency costs in Germany (2002)Executive compensation and ag…Family CEOs vs. Nonfamily CEOs in the Family-Controlled Firm: An Examination of the Level and Sensitivity of Pay to Performance (2000)Family CEOs vs. Nonfamily CEO…Managerial compensation and incentives in for-profit and nonprofit hospitals (1999)Managerial compensation and i…Executive Compensation: Six Questions That Need Answering (1999)Executive Compensation: Six Q…CEO SALARY INCREASES MAY BE RATIONAL AFTER ALL: REFERENTS AND CONTRACTS IN CEO PAY. (1995)CEO SALARY INCREASES MAY BE R…TOP PAY, COMPANY PERFORMANCE AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE† (1994)TOP PAY, COMPANY PERFORMANCE …Contracts and the Market for Executives (1990)Contracts and the Market for …The Modern Corporation and Private Property (1933)The Cost of Capital, Corporation Finance and the Theory of Investment (1958)A Life Cycle Theory of the Firm (1972)Corporate Ownership and Control: The Large Corporation and the Capitalist Class (1974)THE VALUATION OF RISK ASSETS AND THE SELECTION OF RISKY INVESTMENTS IN STOCK PORTFOLIOS AND CAPITAL BUDGETS**This paper is another in a series of interrelated theoretical and statistical studies of corporate financial and investment policies being made under grants from the Rockefeller Foundation, and more recently the Ford Foundation, to the Harvard Business School. The generous support for this work is most gratefully acknowledged. The author is also much indebted to his colleagues Professors Bishop, Christenson, Kahr, Raiffa, and (especially) Schlaifer, for extensive discussion and commentary on an earlier draft of this paper; but responsibility for any errors or imperfections remains strictly his own.[Professor Sharpe's paper, “Capital Asset Prices: A Theory of Market Equilibrium Under Conditions of Risk” (Journal of Finance, September 1964) appeared after this paper was in final form and on its way to the printers. My first section, which parallels the first half of his paper (with corresponding conclusions), sets the algebraic framework for sections II, III and VI, (which have no counterpart in his paper) and for section IV on the equilibrium prices of risk assets, concerning which our results differ significantly for reasons which will be explored elsewhere. Sharpe does not take up the capital budgeting problem developed in section V below.] (1975)Matching compensation and organizational strategies (1990)Moral Hazard and Observability (1979)Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm (1980)Separation of Ownership and Control (1983)CEO turnover, firm performance and corporate governance: empirical evidence on Danish firms (2002)Equal but Inequitable: Who Benefits from Gender-Neutral Tenure Clock Stopping Policies? (2018)Money and Motivation (1977)BOARDS OF DIRECTORS, TOP MANAGEMENT COMPENSATION, AND SHAREHOLDER RETURNS. (1987)Executive Compensation: Six Questions that Need Answering (1999)Firm Strategy and Age Dependence: A Contingent View of the Liabilities of Newness, Adolescence, and Obsolescence (1999)Executive compensation (2008)The Affluent Society (1958)Human Capital (1983)Product Quality and Pay Equity Between Lower-Level Employees and Top Management: An Investigation of Distributive Justice Theory (1992)The dominant logic: retrospective and extension (1995)Executive Job Demands: New Insights for Explaining Strategic Decisions and Leader Behaviors (2005)Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure (1976)Management ownership and market valuation (1988)Social influence effects and managerial compensation evidence from Germany (2006)Determinants of director compensation in two-tier systems: evidence from German panel data (2010)CEO compensation, family control, and institutional investors in Continental Europe (2012)The Role of Nonprofit Enterprise (1980)Multitask Principal–Agent Analyses: Incentive Contracts, Asset Ownership, and Job Design (1991)The Wage Differential between Nonprofit Institutions and Corporations: Getting More by Paying Less? (1998)The Provision of Incentives in Firms (1999)Managerial Incentives in Nonprofit Organizations: Evidence from Hospitals (2002)Principal-agent relationships on the stewardship-agency axis (2006)Agency Costs of Free Cash Flow, Corporate Finance, and Takeovers (1986)Influence of Family Involvement in Management and Ownership on Firm Performance: Evidence From Poland (2009)Weathering the Storm: Family Ownership, Governance, and Performance Through the Financial and Economic Crisis (2015)Nonfamily Members in Family Firms: A Review and Future Research Agenda (2017)The Pricing of Options and Corporate Liabilities (1973)The effect of bonus schemes on accounting decisions (1985)Performance Pay and Top-Management Incentives (1990)Corporate Governance of Banks in Developing Economies: concepts and issues (2004)An empirical examination of the costs and benefits of executive stock options: Evidence from Japan (2005)The Evolution of Income Concentration in Japan, 1886–2005: Evidence from Income Tax Statistics (2008)Asset pricing and the bid-ask spread (1986)The Effect of National Culture on the Choice of Entry Mode (1988)Consistent Covariance Matrix Estimation with Spatially Dependent Panel Data (1998)Ownership structure, risk and performance in the European banking industry (2007)Macroeconomic and bank-specific determinants of non-performing loans in Greece: A comparative study of mortgage, business and consumer loan portfolios (2011)Information Disclosure and Corporate Governance (2012)
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References

  • 1986The theory and practice of econometrics4,342 cited
  • 1933The Modern Corporation and Private Property1,557 cited
  • 1987MANAGERIAL CONTROL, PERFORMANCE, AND EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION.509 cited
  • 1970Managerial Pay and Corporate Performance314 cited
  • 1980The Determinants of Executive Salaries: An Econometric Survey244 cited

Cited by

  • 2000Family CEOs vs. Nonfamily CEOs in the Family-Controlled Firm: An Examination of the Level and Sensitivity of Pay to Performance284 cited
  • 1999Managerial compensation and incentives in for-profit and nonprofit hospitals211 cited
  • 2009Contracts and the Market for Executives203 cited
  • 2002Executive compensation and agency costs in Germany192 cited
  • 1999Executive Compensation: Six Questions That Need Answering192 cited
  • 1990Contracts and the Market for Executives181 cited
  • 1994TOP PAY, COMPANY PERFORMANCE AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE†145 cited
  • 2009Too Good to be True: Board Structural Independence as a Moderator of CEO Pay-for-Firm-Performance137 cited
  • 2005Organizational governance and employee pay: how ownership structure affects the firm's compensation strategy137 cited
  • 2010Economic and psychological perspectives on CEO compensation: a review and synthesis

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128 cited
  • 2011Do CEOS Encounter Within-Tenure Settling Up? A Multiperiod Perspective on Executive Pay and Dismissal121 cited
  • 2007The Determinants of Employee Compensation in Family Firms: Empirical Evidence117 cited
  • 2007The Value of Human Capital Specificity Versus Transferability114 cited
  • 2014Labor Market Advantages of Organizational Status: A Study of Lateral Partner Hiring by Large U.S. Law Firms96 cited
  • 2005Ownership, Corporate Governance and Top Management Pay in Hong Kong92 cited
  • 1995CEO SALARY INCREASES MAY BE RATIONAL AFTER ALL: REFERENTS AND CONTRACTS IN CEO PAY.89 cited