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Probabilistic Coherence and Proper Scoring Rules
7 references·16 citing·33 second hop
Probabilistic Coherence and Proper Scoring Rules (2009)Probabilistic Coherence and Proper Scorin…Strictly Proper Scoring Rules, Prediction, and Estimation (2007)Strictly Proper Scoring Rules…Strictly Proper Scoring Rules, Prediction and Estimation (2004)Strictly Proper Scoring Rules…Axiomatic Characterization of the Quadratic Scoring Rule (1998)Axiomatic Characterization of…A Nonpragmatic Vindication of Probabilism (1998)A Nonpragmatic Vindication of…Elicitation of Personal Probabilities and Expectations (1971)Elicitation of Personal Proba…Choice and Chance: An Introduction to Inductive Logic. (1968)Choice and Chance: An Introdu…Rational Decisions (1952)Rational DecisionsEpistemic Risk and the Demands of Rationality (2022)Epistemic Risk and the Demand…Dutch Book Arguments (2020)Dutch Book ArgumentsUnsettled Thoughts (2019)Unsettled ThoughtsLearning and value change (2019)Learning and value changeHow Do Beliefs Simplify Reasoning? (2019)How Do Beliefs Simplify Reaso…WHAT IS JUSTIFIED CREDENCE? (2018)WHAT IS JUSTIFIED CREDENCE?An Accuracy‐Dominance Argument for Conditionalization (2018)An Accuracy‐Dominance Argumen…Why be (approximately) coherent? (2017)Why be (approximately) cohere…The Foundations of Epistemic Decision Theory (2017)The Foundations of Epistemic …Graded Incoherence for Accuracy-Firsters (2016)Graded Incoherence for Accura…Measuring the overall incoherence of credence functions (2015)Measuring the overall incoher…JAMESIAN EPISTEMOLOGY FORMALISED: AN EXPLICATION OF ‘THE WILL TO BELIEVE’ (2015)JAMESIAN EPISTEMOLOGY FORMALI…Epistemic Utility and Norms for Credences (2013)Epistemic Utility and Norms f…A NEW EPISTEMIC UTILITY ARGUMENT FOR THE PRINCIPAL PRINCIPLE (2013)A NEW EPISTEMIC UTILITY ARGUM…Aggregating Large Sets of Probabilistic Forecasts by Weighted Coherent Adjustment (2011)Aggregating Large Sets of Pro…Aggregating Probabilistic Forecasts from Incoherent and Abstaining Experts (2008)Aggregating Probabilistic For…Le Comportement de l'Homme Rationnel devant le Risque: Critique des Postulats et Axiomes de l'Ecole Americaine (1953)Risk Aversion in the Small and in the Large (1964)Risk Aversion in the Small and in the Large (1976)The Theory of Incentives: The Principal-Agent Model (2001)Measuring Expectations (2004)Scoring Rules and the Evaluation of Probability Assessors (1969)Scoring Rules for Continuous Probability Distributions (1976)Investigating Generalizations of Expected Utility Theory Using Experimental Data (1994)Some Comparisons among Quadratic, Spherical, and Logarithmic Scoring Rules (2007)On eliciting beliefs in strategic games (2009)A Robust Bayesian Truth Serum for Small Populations (2021)Comparing Predictive Accuracy (1994)Probabilistic Forecasts, Calibration and Sharpness (2007)Making and Evaluating Point Forecasts (2011)Generación de series de tiempo financieras sintéticas para "data augmentation" usando redes neuronales generativas adversarias (GAN) (2021)Minnesota studies in the philosophy of science (1956)Humean Supervenience debugged (1999)The Humean Theory of Motivation (1987)Betting on Theories (1993)The Possibility of Practical Reason (1996)Putting Logic in its Place (2004)BELIEF IS CREDENCE ONE (IN CONTEXT) (2013)Accuracy and the Laws of Credence (2016)Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision under Risk (1979)A theory of anticipated utility (1982)Prospect theory: An analysis of decision under risk (1988)What is conditionalization, and why should we do it? (2019)The empirical case for two systems of reasoning. (1996)Individual differences in reasoning: Implications for the rationality debate? (2000)The Essential Child (2003)Bayesian Analysis of DSGE Models (2007)Modelling count data with overdispersion and spatial effects (2006)spBayesfor Large Univariate and Multivariate Point-Referenced Spatio-Temporal Data Models (2015)
this work references cited by second hop

References

  • 2007Strictly Proper Scoring Rules, Prediction, and Estimation5,771 cited
  • 1971Elicitation of Personal Probabilities and Expectations1,228 cited
  • 1952Rational Decisions975 cited
  • 1998A Nonpragmatic Vindication of Probabilism774 cited
  • 1998Axiomatic Characterization of the Quadratic Scoring Rule338 cited
  • 1968Choice and Chance: An Introduction to Inductive Logic.320 cited
  • 2004Strictly Proper Scoring Rules, Prediction and Estimation264 cited

Cited by

  • 2013A NEW EPISTEMIC UTILITY ARGUMENT FOR THE PRINCIPAL PRINCIPLE89 cited
  • 2016Graded Incoherence for Accuracy-Firsters83 cited
  • 2018An Accuracy‐Dominance Argument for Conditionalization78 cited
  • 2008Aggregating Probabilistic Forecasts from Incoherent and Abstaining Experts77 cited
  • 2013Epistemic Utility and Norms for Credences73 cited
  • 2017The Foundations of Epistemic Decision Theory54 cited
  • 2011Aggregating Large Sets of Probabilistic Forecasts by Weighted Coherent Adjustment54 cited
  • 2020Dutch Book Arguments53 cited
  • 2022Epistemic Risk and the Demands of Rationality

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52 cited
  • 2015Measuring the overall incoherence of credence functions52 cited
  • 2019Unsettled Thoughts48 cited
  • 2015JAMESIAN EPISTEMOLOGY FORMALISED: AN EXPLICATION OF ‘THE WILL TO BELIEVE’46 cited
  • 2017Why be (approximately) coherent?46 cited
  • 2019How Do Beliefs Simplify Reasoning?45 cited
  • 2018WHAT IS JUSTIFIED CREDENCE?42 cited
  • 2019Learning and value change42 cited