Presidential Power and Republican Government: The Theory and Practice of OMB Review of Agency Rules

Abstract

This article focuses on Office of Management and Budget (OMB) review of agency rules, a major institutional innovation of the Reagan Administration which established central clearance of administrative rules for the first time in our history. It places OMB review in theoretical perspective by examining the traditional paradigm of public administration, the breakdown of that paradigm, and the manner in which the theory offered to justify OMB review both draws on prior elements of doctrine and combines them in new and distinctive ways. In addition, it measures practice against theory by analyzing the actual impacts of OMB review on presidential power, objective or impartial administrative decision making, and the formal safeguards established by administrative procedures and court review. Finally, the article analyzes the broader institutional significance of OMB review by assessing its theory and practice in terms of their implications for adapting republican political institutions in the United States to an administrative state.

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