AN EXPRESSIVE VOTING THEORY OF STRIKES

Amihai Glazer

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Labor Movements and Unions Labor market dynamics and wage inequality Game Theory and Voting Systems

Abstract

Union members may vote for a strike even if they do not expect to thereby increase their wages. For under majority voting any one member's vote for a strike is unlikely to be decisive. A union member who obtains a non‐infinitesimal emotional benefit from the act of voting for a strike may therefore vote in its favor. This hypothesis can explain the existence of strikes and the conditions which make strikes especially likely.

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References

1958An Economic Theory of Democracy.1965The Symbolic Uses of Politics.1990A Mechanism for Social Selection and Successful Altruism 1984An Economic Theorist's Book of Tales 201810. Passions within Reason 1969Bargaining theory trade unions, & industorial strike activity 1989Rational Turnout: The Neglected Role of Groups 1980Conflict and Contract: The Case of Strikes

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2012Rebellion Against Reason? A Study of Expressive Choice and Strikes 2014A study of expressive choice and strikes

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