The elementary economics of social dilemmas

B. Curtis Eaton

47 citations0/0 files storedCanadian Journal of Economics/Revue canadienne d économique

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Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies Game Theory and Applications Evolutionary Game Theory and Cooperation

Abstract

Abstract. A social dilemma is, in essence, a prisoners’ dilemma in a continuous strategy space. I discuss a number of social dilemmas that have caught my attention, offer an elementary, diagrammatic synthesis of them, and discuss some of the economic insights that the diagrams capture, including incentives for pre‐commitment. Finally, I model pre‐commitment via delegation and link results to the literature on the evolution of preferences.

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References

1985Multimarket Oligopoly: Strategic Substitutes and Complements 1985Export subsidies and international market share rivalry 1982Aggregate Demand Management in Search Equilibrium 2001Efficient Rent Seeking 1988Coordinating Coordination Failures in Keynesian Models 1980The Role of Investment in Entry-Deterrence 1966An Economic Theory of Alliances 1979Market Structure and Innovation

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