This research utilized longitudinal and cross-sectional methods to investigate the relation between the development of a representational theory of mind and children 's growing ability to search their own minds for appropriate problem solutions. In the first experiment, 59 preschool children were given 3 false-belief tasks and a divergent-thinking task. Those children who passed false-belief tasks produced significantly more items, as well as more original items, in response to divergent-thinking questions than those children who failed. This significant association persisted even when chronological age and verbal and nonverbal general ability were partialed out. In a second study, 20 children who failed the false-belief tasks in the first experiment were retested 3 months later. Again, those who now passed the false-belief tasks were significantly better at the divergent-thinking tusk than those who continued to fail. The associations between measures of divergent thinking and understanding false beliefs remained significant when controlling, for the covariates. Earlier divergent-thinking scores did not predict false-belief understanding three months later. Instead, children who passed false-belief tasks on the second measure improved significantly in relation to their own earlier performance and improved significantly more than children who continued to fail. False-belief task performance was significantly correlated to the amount of intraindividual improvement in divergent thinking even when age and verbal and nonverbal skills were partialed out. These findings suggest that developments in common underlying skills are responsible .for the improvement in understanding other minds and searching one's own. Changes in representational and executive skills are discussed as potential causes of the improvement.
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