SZodixStudyAcademic Library
ShelvesOpen access
Study · an open academic library·Metadata from OpenAlex (CC0)·Shelves·OpenAlex metadata, de-duplicated
Power of Incentives with Motivated Agents in Public Organizations
16 references·0 citing·47 second hop
Power of Incentives with Motivated Agents in Public Organizations (2011)Power of Incentives with Motivated Agents…Competition and Incentives with Motivated Agents (2005)Competition and Incentives wi…Motivation, Agency, and Public Policy (2003)Motivation, Agency, and Publi…The Theory of Incentives (2002)The Theory of IncentivesIncentives and Organizations in the Public Sector: An Interpretative Review (2002)Incentives and Organizations …The Power of Incentives (2000)The Power of IncentivesParticipation Constraints in Adverse Selection Models (2000)Participation Constraints in …‘Public service motivation’ as an argument for government provision (2000)‘Public service motivation’ a…Contracting for health services when patient demand does not reflect quality (1998)Contracting for health servic…Optimal Health Insurance and Provider Payment (1997)Optimal Health Insurance and …On Countervailing Incentives (1995)On Countervailing IncentivesImpure Altruism and Donations to Public Goods: A Theory of Warm-Glow Giving (1990)Impure Altruism and Donations…Bureaucracy: what government agencies do and why they do it (1990)Bureaucracy: what government …Giving with Impure Altruism: Applications to Charity and Ricardian Equivalence (1989)Giving with Impure Altruism: …Countervailing incentives in agency problems (1989)Countervailing incentives in …Using Cost Observation to Regulate Firms (1986)Using Cost Observation to Reg…Provider behavior under prospective reimbursement (1986)Provider behavior under prosp…Moral Hazard and Observability (1979)Moral Hazard in Teams (1982)Multitask Principal–Agent Analyses: Incentive Contracts, Asset Ownership, and Job Design (1991)Teacher Performance Pay: Experimental Evidence from India (2011)TOWARD A THEORY OF NON-PROFIT INSTITUTIONS: AN ECONOMIC MODEL OF A HOSPITAL (1969)Risk Sharing and Incentives in the Principal and Agent Relationship (1979)Doctors and Their Workshops (1980)Reimbursing Health Plans and Health Providers: Efficiency in Production versus Selection (1996)Chapter 11 The anatomy of health insurance (2000)Physician Agency (2000)An Analysis of the Principal-Agent Problem (1983)Aggregation and Linearity in the Provision of Intertemporal Incentives (1987)The Dynamics of Incentive Contracts (1988)Incentives in Principal-Agent Relationships (1991)The Theory of Incentives: The Principal-Agent Model (2001)A Theory of Social Interactions (1974)Are Government Bonds Net Wealth? (1974)On the private provision of public goods (1986)A Theory of Trickle-Down Growth and Development (1997)The Moral Foundations of Trust (2005)Beyond Markets and States: Polycentric Governance of Complex Economic Systems (2010)Rational Fools: A Critique of the Behavioral Foundations of Economic Theory (1977)The Theory of Externalities, Public Goods, and Club Goods (1996)Cooperation and Punishment in Public Goods Experiments (2000)The Role of Social Capital in Financial Development (2004)The Grammar of Society (2005)Equilibrium Unemployment as a Worker Discipline Device (1986)Production, Information Costs and Economic Organization (1996)Privatization and Its Reverse: Explaining the Dynamics of the Government Contracting Process (2004)Pay for Performance in the Public Sector--Benefits and (Hidden) Costs (2009)Strengthening State Capabilities: The Role of Financial Incentives in the Call to Public Service* (2013)Strategic Information Transmission (1982)Reinventing Government: How the Entrepreneurial Spirit is Transforming the Public Sector (1995)Identity and Schooling: Some Lessons for the Economics of Education (2002)A “Selection Model” of Political Representation* (2009)The second wave of digital-era governance: a quasi-paradigm for government on the Web (2013)Exit, Voice and Loyalty: Responses to Decline in Firms, Organizations, and States. (1970)Markets and Hierarchies (1975)Foundations of social theory (1990)WHAT’S MEASURED IS WHAT MATTERS: TARGETS AND GAMING IN THE ENGLISH PUBLIC HEALTH CARE SYSTEM (2006)Revisiting the Motivational Bases of Public Service: Twenty Years of Research and an Agenda for the Future (2010)Common Method Bias in Public Management Studies (2014)What Is Governance? (2013)Wicked Problems (2013)Auctions for conservation contracts: an empirical examination of Victoria's BushTender trial (2003)Detrimental effects of sanctions on human altruism (2003)The company of strangers: a natural history of economic life (2004)
this work references cited by second hop

References

  • 1990Impure Altruism and Donations to Public Goods: A Theory of Warm-Glow Giving5,817 cited
  • 1990Bureaucracy: what government agencies do and why they do it3,795 cited
  • 1989Giving with Impure Altruism: Applications to Charity and Ricardian Equivalence3,163 cited
  • 2002The Theory of Incentives2,116 cited
  • 2005Competition and Incentives with Motivated Agents1,404 cited
  • 1986Using Cost Observation to Regulate Firms1,215 cited
  • 2002Incentives and Organizations in the Public Sector: An Interpretative Review1,104 cited
  • 2003Motivation, Agency, and Public Policy924 cited
  • 1986Provider behavior under prospective reimbursement724 cited
  • 2000‘Public service motivation’ as an argument for government provision541 cited
  • 2000Participation Constraints in Adverse Selection Models451 cited
  • 1989Countervailing incentives in agency problems417 cited
  • 1998Contracting for health services when patient demand does not reflect quality330 cited
  • 2000The Power of Incentives290 cited
  • 1995On Countervailing Incentives280 cited
  • 1997Optimal Health Insurance and Provider Payment

Only edges whose both ends are imported exist here. Widen the year window, or show the whole map. Back to the work

212 cited

Cited by

No citing works inside the corpus for this window.