Accounting Information, Employees and Collective Bargaining

K. T. Maunders · B. J. Foley

18 citations0/0 files storedJournal of Business Finance &amp Accounting

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Labor Movements and Unions Auditing, Earnings Management, Governance Accounting Theory and Financial Reporting

Abstract

Social and political opinion in the United Kingdom has been moving in the direction of greater disclosure by companies of financial and economic information of interest to employees and trade union negotiators. This article examines the arguments which surround the issue. In particular, the role of information in the collective bargaining context is investigated in the light of a fairly simple bargaining model, The tactical and strategic impact of greater disclosure is indicated with the aid of the model. Finally the article highlights some implications for companies, trade unions and accountants.

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2023Not just for investors: The role of earnings announcements in guiding job seekers 2005CEO Compensation and Stakeholders' Claims*1988Some Implications of Auditor and Client Lobbying Activities: A Comparative Analysis 1981INFORMATION DISCLOSURE TO EMPLOYEES AND RATIONAL EXPECTATIONS

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