SZodixStudyAcademic Library
ShelvesOpen access
Study · an open academic library·Metadata from OpenAlex (CC0)·Shelves·OpenAlex metadata, de-duplicated
Getting It Right By Accident
16 references·3 citing·28 second hop
Getting It Right By Accident (2010)Getting It Right By AccidentEpistemic Luck (2005)Epistemic LuckWhat's Wrong with Moore's Argument? (2004)What's Wrong with Moore's Arg…Luminosity and the Safety of Knowledge (2004)Luminosity and the Safety of …(Anti‐)Sceptics Simple and Subtle: G.E. Moore and John McDowell* (2002)(Anti‐)Sceptics Simple and Su…Knowledge and Its Limits (2000)Knowledge and Its LimitsHow to Defeat Opposition to Moore (1999)How to Defeat Opposition to M…Solving the Skeptical Problem (1995)Solving the Skeptical ProblemWarrant and Proper Function (1993)Warrant and Proper FunctionReality, Representation, and Projection (1993)Reality, Representation, and …The Structure of Empirical Knowledge (1988)The Structure of Empirical Kn…The Theory of Epistemic Rationality (1987)The Theory of Epistemic Ratio…Philosophical Explanations. (1983)Philosophical Explanations.What is Justified Belief? (1979)What is Justified Belief?Discrimination and Perceptual Knowledge (1976)Discrimination and Perceptual…An Analysis of Factual Knowledge (1968)An Analysis of Factual Knowle…Is Justified True Belief Knowledge? (1963)Is Justified True Belief Know…Knowledge, justification, and (a sort of) safe belief (2018)Knowledge, justification, and…Conclusive Reasons and Epistemic Luck (2015)Conclusive Reasons and Episte…Knowledge and Two Forms of Non‐Accidental Truth (2013)Knowledge and Two Forms of No…Scorekeeping in a language game (1979)The Skeptic and the Dogmatist (2000)Knowledge and Lotteries (2003)Contemporary debates in epistemology (2005)Moral Luck (1981)Reason, Truth and History (1981)Knowledge and its Limits (2002)Is Understanding A Species Of Knowledge? (2006)Why we don’t deserve credit for everything we know (2006)What Is "Naturalized Epistemology?" (1988)Metaepistemology and Skepticism (1990)Expanding the Dimensions of Epistemic Cognition: Arguments From Philosophy and Psychology (2011)Knowledge in a Social World (1999)Knowledge and Practical Interests (2005)The Knower and the Known: The Nature of Knowledge in Research on Teaching (1994)Why ‘What Works’ Still Won’t Work: From Evidence-Based Education to Value-Based Education (2010)Looking for Information: A Survey of Research on Information Seeking, Needs, and Behavior (2016)Knowledge and its Place in Nature (2002)Moral Realism (2003)Origins of Objectivity (2010)Anti-luck epistemology (2006)Anti-Luck Virtue Epistemology (2012)Understanding, Explanation, and Scientific Knowledge (2017)Compassionate Phenomenal Conservatism (2007)Grounding in the image of causation (2015)Folk Psychology as Simulation (1986)The association between corporate social-responsibility and financial performance: The paradox of social cost (1996)A Darwinian Dilemma for Realist Theories of Value (2005)
this work references cited by second hop

References

  • 2000Knowledge and Its Limits5,056 cited
  • 1963Is Justified True Belief Knowledge?3,234 cited
  • 1983Philosophical Explanations.2,039 cited
  • 1976Discrimination and Perceptual Knowledge1,883 cited
  • 1993Warrant and Proper Function1,703 cited
  • 1979What is Justified Belief?1,526 cited
  • 1995Solving the Skeptical Problem1,280 cited
  • 1988The Structure of Empirical Knowledge1,165 cited
  • 1999How to Defeat Opposition to Moore970 cited
  • 2005Epistemic Luck873 cited
  • 2004What's Wrong with Moore's Argument?705 cited
  • 1987The Theory of Epistemic Rationality505 cited
  • 1993Reality, Representation, and Projection500 cited
  • 2002(Anti‐)Sceptics Simple and Subtle: G.E. Moore and John McDowell*430 cited
  • 2004Luminosity and the Safety of Knowledge286 cited
  • 1968An Analysis of Factual Knowledge252 cited

Cited by

  • 2018Knowledge, justification, and (a sort of) safe belief

Only edges whose both ends are imported exist here. Widen the year window, or show the whole map. Back to the work

34 cited
  • 2013Knowledge and Two Forms of Non‐Accidental Truth23 cited
  • 2015Conclusive Reasons and Epistemic Luck20 cited