Stable Equilibria—A Reformulation

Jean‐François Mertens

161 citations0/0 files storedMathematics of Operations Research

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Game Theory and Applications Game Theory and Voting Systems Economic theories and models

Abstract

A reformulation of stable equilibria is given, yielding a number of additional properties like backwards induction while still giving “typically,” i.e., except in “made up” examples, the same solutions.

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References

2019Theory of games and economic behavior 1960The Strategy of Conflict 1975Reexamination of the perfectness concept for equilibrium points in extensive games 1987Signaling Games and Stable Equilibria 1947Theory of Games and Economic Behavior 2004Games with Incomplete Information Played by “Bayesian” Players, I–III: Part I. The Basic Model 1986On the Strategic Stability of Equilibria 1987Equilibrium Selection in Signaling Games

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1996Chapter 2 Computation of equilibria in finite games 2007The power of paradox: some recent developments in interactive epistemology 1990On the Definition of the Strategic Stability of Equilibria 2008On Forward Induction 2002Chapter 45 Computing equilibria for two-person games 1990Refinement of Nash Equilibrium: The Main Ideas 1994

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