Raids, Rewards, and Reputations in the Market for Managerial Talent

C. Edward Fee · Charles J. Hadlock

385 citations0/0 files storedReview of Financial Studies

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Corporate Finance and Governance Financial Markets and Investment Strategies Human Resource and Talent Management

Abstract

We find that executives who jump to chief executive officer (CEO) positions at new employers come from firms that exhibit above-average stock price performance. This relationship is more pronounced for more senior executives. No such relationship exists for jumps to non-CEO positions. Stock options and restricted stock do not appear to significantly affect the likelihood of jumping ship, but the existence of an “heir apparent” on the management team increases the likelihood that executives will leave for non-CEO positions elsewhere. Hiring grants used to attract managers are correlated with the equity position forfeited at the prior employer and with the prior employer's performance.

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References

2001Econometric Analysis of Cross Section and Panel Data 1992The Cross-Section of Expected Stock Returns 1972Conditional logit analysis of qualitative choice behavior 1983Limited-dependent and qualitative variables in econometrics 1980Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm 1979Job Matching and the Theory of Turnover 1988Herd Behavior and Investment 1997Detecting long-run abnormal stock returns: The empirical power and specification of test statistics

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