Equilibria with Communication in a Job Market Example

Françoise Forges

98 citations0/0 files storedThe Quarterly Journal of Economics

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Game Theory and Applications Game Theory and Voting Systems Economic theories and models

Abstract

We study (costless) information transmission from a job applicant to an employer who must decide whether to hire him and, if so, which position to give him. We construct equilibrium payoffs requiring at least two signaling steps, or even that no deadline be imposed on the (plain) conversation. The set of communication equilibrium payoffs (achieved with the help of a communication device) is larger than the set of equilibrium payoffs of the plain conversation game but coincides with the set of correlated equilibrium payoffs.

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1985Nonzero-Sum Two-Person Repeated Games with Incomplete Information

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2016Selling Information 2006Contracting with imperfect commitment and noisy communication 2003Communication and Voting with Double-Sided Information 2008Full revelation of information in Sender–Receiver games of persuasion 1994Chapter 25 Signalling 2009Signaling Games 2008Long persuasion games 2009The communication cost of selfishness

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