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Corporate tax evasion with agency costs · Study

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ArticleCorporate tax evasion with agency costs

Keith J. Crocker2004

Article2004

Corporate tax evasion with agency costs

Keith J. Crocker · Joel Slemrod

506 citations·0/0 files stored·Journal of Public Economics

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Taxation and Compliance Studies Corporate Taxation and Avoidance Law, Economics, and Judicial Systems

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References

1979Moral Hazard and Observability 1972Income tax evasion: a theoretical analysis 1978Monopoly and product quality 1979Optimal contracts and competitive markets with costly state verification 1979Incentive Compatibility and the Bargaining Problem 1974Income tax evasion: A theoretical analysis 1984A complete solution to a class of principal-agent problems with an application to the control of a self-managed firm 2003What Can We Infer about a Firm's Taxable Income from Its Financial Statements?

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2018WHAT MOTIVATES TAX COMPLIANCE?2016Why Can Modern Governments Tax So Much? An Agency Model of Firms as Fiscal Intermediaries 2012Importing corruption culture from overseas: Evidence from corporate tax evasion in the United States 2015Corruption and firm tax evasion 2015Tax Avoidance and the Implications of Weak Internal Controls 2008The importance of IRS monitoring to debt pricing in private firms☆

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Year2004

Typearticle

Published2004-12-15

VenueJournal of Public Economics

ISSN-L0047-2727

Languageen

Citations506

Files0 public / 0

ShelfTaxation and Compliance Studies

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doi10.1016/j.jpubeco.2004.08.003

openalex_workW2148090769

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2007The economics of earnings manipulation and managerial compensation

2005Corporate Tax Avoidance and Firm Value