References

• 1979Moral Hazard and Observability8,358 cited
• 1991Multitask Principal–Agent Analyses: Incentive Contracts, Asset Ownership, and Job Design6,042 cited
• 1982Moral Hazard in Teams4,992 cited
• 1983An Analysis of the Principal-Agent Problem2,127 cited
• 2001The Theory of Incentives: The Principal-Agent Model2,041 cited
• 1992An Analysis of the Principal-Agent Problem1,913 cited
• 2003Relational Incentive Contracts1,103 cited
• 1994Subjective Performance Measures in Optimal Incentive Contracts955 cited
• 1993Subjective Performance Measures in Optimal Incentive Contracts921 cited
• 1994Performance Measure Congruity and Diversity in Multi-Task Principal/Agent Relations.914 cited
• 1989Sensitivity, Precision, and Linear Aggregation of Signals for Performance Evaluation877 cited
• 1985The First-Order Approach to Principal-Agent Problems870 cited
• 1987The Existence of Self-Enforcing Implicit Contracts656 cited
• 1980Incentives in Public Decision-Making.609 cited
• 1988Justifying the First-Order Approach to Principal-Agent Problems511 cited
• 1997Incomplete Contracts and Strategic Ambiguity