Optimal Deterrence, Uninformed Individuals, and Acquiring Information about Whether Acts Are Subject to Sanctions

Louis Kaplow

87 citations0/0 files storedThe Journal of Law Economics and Organization

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Law, Economics, and Judicial Systems Merger and Competition Analysis Legal and Constitutional Studies

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LOUIS KAPLOW; Optimal Deterrence, Uninformed Individuals, and Acquiring Information about Whether Acts Are Subject to Sanctions, The Journal of Law, Econom

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1980Rethinking Criminal Law 1985Criminal Law and the Optimal Use of Nonmonetary Sanctions as a Deterrent

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1992Optimal Sanctions When Individuals are Imperfectly Informed About the Probability of Apprehension

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