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Optimal Deterrence, Uninformed Individuals, and Acquiring Information about Whether Acts Are Subject to Sanctions
2 references·1 citing·9 second hop
Optimal Deterrence, Uninformed Individuals, and Acquiring Information about Whether Acts Are Subject to Sanctions (1990)Optimal Deterrence, Uninformed Individual…Criminal Law and the Optimal Use of Nonmonetary Sanctions as a Deterrent (1985)Criminal Law and the Optimal …Rethinking Criminal Law (1980)Rethinking Criminal LawOptimal Sanctions When Individuals are Imperfectly Informed About the Probability of Apprehension (1992)Optimal Sanctions When Indivi…Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach (1968)Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach (1968)Social Osmosis and Patterns of Crime (1991)Justice, liability, and blame: community views and the criminal law (1995)Crime and Culpability: A Theory of Criminal Law (2009)Crime, reason and history : a critical introduction to criminal law (2014)The Optimal Use of Nonmonetary Sanctions as a Deterrent (1987)The Economic Theory of Public Enforcement of Law (1998)Chapter 6 The Theory of Public Enforcement of Law (2007)
this work references cited by second hop

References

  • 1980Rethinking Criminal Law280 cited
  • 1985Criminal Law and the Optimal Use of Nonmonetary Sanctions as a Deterrent208 cited

Cited by

  • 1992Optimal Sanctions When Individuals are Imperfectly Informed About the Probability of Apprehension74 cited

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