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Control and Feedback in Economic Regulation: The Case of the NLRB
16 references·16 citing·33 second hopsampled
Control and Feedback in Economic Regulation: The Case of the NLRB (1985)Control and Feedback in Economic Regulati…The Theory of Economic Regulation (2021)The Theory of Economic Regula…The Political Economy of Federalism (1985)The Political Economy of Fede…The New Economics of Organization (1984)The New Economics of Organiza…Congressional Oversight Overlooked: Police Patrols versus Fire Alarms (1984)Congressional Oversight Overl…American Political Science review (1984)American Political Science re…Bureaucratic Discretion or Congressional Control? Regulatory Policymaking by the Federal Trade Commission (1983)Bureaucratic Discretion or Co…Political Parties and Macroeconomic Policy (1977)Political Parties and Macroec…Toward a More General Theory of Regulation (1976)Toward a More General Theory …Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure (1976)Theory of the firm: Manageria…The Political Business Cycle (1975)The Political Business CycleStill the Century of Corporatism? (1974)Still the Century of Corporat…The Economic Theory of Agency: The Principal's Problem. (1973)The Economic Theory of Agency…A Garbage Can Model of Organizational Choice (1972)A Garbage Can Model of Organi…The Theory of Economic Regulation (1971)The Theory of Economic Regula…Bureaucracy and Representative Government (1971)Bureaucracy and Representativ…A Behavioral Theory of the Firm (1964)A Behavioral Theory of the Fi…Organizational Reputation, Regulatory Talk, and Strategic Silence (2012)Organizational Reputation, Re…Separated Powers in the United States: The Ideology of Agencies, Presidents, and Congress (2011)Separated Powers in the Unite…Information Processing and Policy Dynamics (2009)Information Processing and Po…The Third Force? Independent Regulatory Agencies and Elected Politicians in Europe (2005)The Third Force? Independent …Flexing Muscle: Corporate Political Expenditures as Signals to the Bureaucracy (2005)Flexing Muscle: Corporate Pol…Regulation after delegation: independent regulatory agencies in Europe (2002)Regulation after delegation: …Groups, the Media, Agency Waiting Costs, and FDA Drug Approval (2002)Groups, the Media, Agency Wai…Cumulating the Intellectual Gold of Case Study Research (2001)Cumulating the Intellectual G…Comparing Varieties of Agency Theory in Economics, Political Science, and Sociology: An Illustration from State Policy Implementation (1999)Comparing Varieties of Agency…Comparing Interest Group Scores across Time and Chambers: Adjusted ADA Scores for the U.S. Congress (1999)Comparing Interest Group Scor…Positive Theories of Congressional Institutions (1995)Positive Theories of Congress…The Dynamics of Political Control of the Bureaucracy (1991)The Dynamics of Political Con…Cooperative Regulatory Enforcement and the Politics of Administrative Effectiveness (1991)Cooperative Regulatory Enforc…Regulatory Capture, Public Interest, and the Public Agenda: Toward a Synthesis (1990)Regulatory Capture, Public In…Interests, Institutions, and Positive Theory: The Politics of the NLRB (1987)Interests, Institutions, and …Regulatory Enforcement in a Federalist System (1986)Regulatory Enforcement in a F…Decision Analysis: Introductory Lectures on Choices Under Uncertainty. 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(1936)Time Series Analysis: Forecasting and Control (1977)The “new public management” in the 1980s: Variations on a theme (1995)The New Politics of the Welfare State (2001)Trust and Growth (2001)The Nature of the Firm (1937)CAPITAL ASSET PRICES: A THEORY OF MARKET EQUILIBRIUM UNDER CONDITIONS OF RISK* (1964)The Pricing of Options and Corporate Liabilities (1973)Separation of Ownership and Control (1983)Corporate financing and investment decisions when firms have information that investors do not have (1984)Law and Finance (1998)The Regulation of Entry (2000)The great reversals: the politics of financial development in the twentieth century (2003)Testing Theories of American Politics: Elites, Interest Groups, and Average Citizens (2014)A PUBLIC MANAGEMENT FOR ALL SEASONS? (1991)The Socialist System (1992)The New Public Governance? 1 (2006)Democracy and dictatorship revisited (2009)A Theory of Competition Among Pressure Groups for Political Influence (1983)World Investment Report (2017)Toward a knowledge‐based theory of the firm (1996)Toward a Theory of Stakeholder Identification and Salience: Defining the Principle of who and What Really Counts (1997)Dynamic capabilities: what are they? (2000)
this work references cited by second hop· second hop is a sample of the most-cited connections

References

  • 1976Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure71,441 cited
  • 1971The Theory of Economic Regulation8,084 cited
  • 1972A Garbage Can Model of Organizational Choice7,956 cited
  • 2021The Theory of Economic Regulation5,483 cited
  • 1971Bureaucracy and Representative Government5,197 cited
  • 1976Toward a More General Theory of Regulation4,771 cited
  • 1973The Economic Theory of Agency: The Principal's Problem.4,296 cited
  • 1975The Political Business Cycle3,951 cited
  • 1977Political Parties and Macroeconomic Policy3,367 cited
  • 1964A Behavioral Theory of the Firm3,009 cited
  • 1984Congressional Oversight Overlooked: Police Patrols versus Fire Alarms2,936 cited
  • 1974Still the Century of Corporatism?2,757 cited
  • 1984The New Economics of Organization1,972 cited
  • 1984American Political Science review1,874 cited
  • 1985The Political Economy of Federalism1,445 cited
  • 1983Bureaucratic Discretion or Congressional Control? Regulatory Policymaking by the Federal Trade Commission1,432 cited

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Cited by

  • 1991The Dynamics of Political Control of the Bureaucracy750 cited
  • 1995Positive Theories of Congressional Institutions425 cited
  • 1990Regulatory Capture, Public Interest, and the Public Agenda: Toward a Synthesis414 cited
  • 2001Cumulating the Intellectual Gold of Case Study Research358 cited
  • 1999Comparing Interest Group Scores across Time and Chambers: Adjusted ADA Scores for the U.S. Congress343 cited
  • 2002Groups, the Media, Agency Waiting Costs, and FDA Drug Approval335 cited
  • 1991Cooperative Regulatory Enforcement and the Politics of Administrative Effectiveness297 cited
  • 2005Flexing Muscle: Corporate Political Expenditures as Signals to the Bureaucracy282 cited
  • 1986Regulatory Enforcement in a Federalist System279 cited
  • 1999Comparing Varieties of Agency Theory in Economics, Political Science, and Sociology: An Illustration from State Policy Implementation244 cited
  • 2002Regulation after delegation: independent regulatory agencies in Europe231 cited
  • 2005The Third Force? Independent Regulatory Agencies and Elected Politicians in Europe220 cited
  • 2009Information Processing and Policy Dynamics219 cited
  • 2011Separated Powers in the United States: The Ideology of Agencies, Presidents, and Congress215 cited
  • 1987Interests, Institutions, and Positive Theory: The Politics of the NLRB205 cited
  • 2012Organizational Reputation, Regulatory Talk, and Strategic Silence196 cited