The Theory of Political Elasticity

Abstract

Political systems are most effective when authority is widely dispersed without diminishing the ultimate responsibility of top leadership for results. Administrative effectiveness depends upon the capacity and willingness of leaders to delegate operational responsibility to subordinates without reducing supervisory prerogatives and correctional potential. Insofar as leaders must rely upon nonpersuasive forms of power (e.g., coercion, corruption, or intimidation), their capacity to delegate responsibility is limited. The more elastic the organization or political system, the softer are the more normal manifestations of power, allowing and encouraging delegation of responsibility, decentralization, widespread participation, deregulation, communication from below, and constructive criticism. At the same time, supervision remains effective, facilitating the introduction of more intrusive forms of power (coercion, discipline, and punishment) as needed. Political elasticity theory is here used to overcome such persistent dichotomies in administrative literature as: leadership followership; conflict/harmony; centralization/decentralization; regulation/deregulation; private sector/public sector control; and elitism/pluralism. It is also used to revaluate development administration literature.

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