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Revenue maximization with a single sample
12 references·16 citing·33 second hop
Revenue maximization with a single sample (2010)Revenue maximization with a single sampleSimple versus optimal mechanisms (2009)Simple versus optimal mechani…Optimal mechanism design and money burning (2008)Optimal mechanism design and …Competitive auctions (2006)Competitive auctionsRobust Mechanism Design (2005)Robust Mechanism DesignApproximation techniques for utilitarian mechanism design (2005)Approximation techniques for …Optimal Pricing Mechanisms with Unknown Demand (2003)Optimal Pricing Mechanisms wi…Truth revelation in approximately efficient combinatorial auctions (2002)Truth revelation in approxima…Truthful mechanisms for one-parameter agents (2001)Truthful mechanisms for one-p…Competitive auctions and digital goods (2001)Competitive auctions and digi…Truth Revelation in Rapid, Approximately Efficient Combinatorial Auctions (1999)Truth Revelation in Rapid, Ap…Auctions Versus Negotiations (1996)Auctions Versus NegotiationsOptimal Auction Design (1981)Optimal Auction DesignThe sample complexity of auctions with side information (2016)The sample complexity of auct…Making the Most of Your Samples (2015)Making the Most of Your Sampl…Dynamic Pricing with Limited Supply (2015)Dynamic Pricing with Limited …Combinatorial Auctions via Posted Prices (2015)Combinatorial Auctions via Po…Simultaneous bayesian auctions and computational complexity (2014)Simultaneous bayesian auction…Revenue maximization with a single sample (2014)Revenue maximization with a s…Regret Minimization for Reserve Prices in Second-Price Auctions (2014)Regret Minimization for Reser…Optimal Design for Multi-Item Auctions: A Robust Optimization Approach (2014)Optimal Design for Multi-Item…The Simple Economics of Approximately Optimal Auctions (2013)The Simple Economics of Appro…Dynamic pricing with limited supply (2012)Dynamic pricing with limited …Budget Feasible Mechanism Design: From Prior-Free to Bayesian (2012)Budget Feasible Mechanism Des…On optimal single-item auctions (2011)On optimal single-item auctio…Mechanism Design via Correlation Gap (2011)Mechanism Design via Correlat…Envy, truth, and profit (2011)Envy, truth, and profitBayesian Combinatorial Auctions: Expanding Single Buyer Mechanisms to Many Buyers (2011)Bayesian Combinatorial Auctio…Bayesian Combinatorial Auctions: Expanding Single Buyer Mechanisms to Many Buyers (2011)Bayesian Combinatorial Auctio…Human behavior and the principle of least effort (1949)COUNTERSPECULATION, AUCTIONS, AND COMPETITIVE SEALED TENDERS (1961)A Course in Game Theory (1994)Multi-unit auctions with budget-constrained bidders (2005)On profit-maximizing envy-free pricing (2005)Incentives in Teams (1973)Combinatorial auctions with decreasing marginal utilities (2005)Truthful approximation mechanisms for restricted combinatorial auctions (2008)Approximate mechanism design without money (2009)Social Choice and Individual Values. (1951)Towards a characterization of truthful combinatorial auctions (2004)Takeover Bids, The Free-Rider Problem, and the Theory of the Corporation (1980)A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding (1982)Auctions Versus Negotiations in Procurement: An Empirical Analysis (2008)Demand Reduction and Inefficiency in Multi-Unit Auctions (2014)Obviously Strategy-Proof Mechanisms (2017)Good News and Bad News: Representation Theorems and Applications (1981)Consumer Privacy and the Market for Customer Information (2004)Exploring the economic value of open government data (2016)Games with Incomplete Information Played by “Bayesian” Players, I–III Part I. The Basic Model (1967)Formulation of Bayesian analysis for games with incomplete information (1985)Internet Advertising and the Generalized Second Price Auction: Selling Billions of Dollars Worth of Keywords (2006)An Introduction to the Theory of Mechanism Design (2015)Robustness and Linear Contracts (2015)Efficient mechanisms for bilateral trading (1983)The interdisciplinary study of coordination (1994)A Simple and Approximately Optimal Mechanism for an Additive Buyer (2014)The sample complexity of revenue maximization (2014)Twenty Lectures on Algorithmic Game Theory (2016)The communication requirements of efficient allocations and supporting prices (2005)Selling privacy at auction (2013)Mechanism Design and Approximation (2014)Optimal Allocation with Costly Verification (2014)
this work references cited by second hop

References

  • 1981Optimal Auction Design5,938 cited
  • 1996Auctions Versus Negotiations809 cited
  • 2002Truth revelation in approximately efficient combinatorial auctions658 cited
  • 2005Robust Mechanism Design616 cited
  • 2001Truthful mechanisms for one-parameter agents521 cited
  • 2009Simple versus optimal mechanisms317 cited
  • 2001Competitive auctions and digital goods268 cited
  • 1999Truth Revelation in Rapid, Approximately Efficient Combinatorial Auctions223 cited
  • 2008Optimal mechanism design and money burning194 cited
  • 2003Optimal Pricing Mechanisms with Unknown Demand192 cited
  • 2006Competitive auctions191 cited
  • 2005Approximation techniques for utilitarian mechanism design164 cited

Cited by

  • 2011Mechanism Design via Correlation Gap124 cited
  • 2015Combinatorial Auctions via Posted Prices121 cited
  • 2014Revenue maximization with a single sample116 cited
  • 2012Dynamic pricing with limited supply98 cited
  • 2014

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Regret Minimization for Reserve Prices in Second-Price Auctions
97 cited
  • 2011Bayesian Combinatorial Auctions: Expanding Single Buyer Mechanisms to Many Buyers95 cited
  • 2011On optimal single-item auctions73 cited
  • 2016The sample complexity of auctions with side information72 cited
  • 2015Dynamic Pricing with Limited Supply68 cited
  • 2011Bayesian Combinatorial Auctions: Expanding Single Buyer Mechanisms to Many Buyers64 cited
  • 2015Making the Most of Your Samples63 cited
  • 2013The Simple Economics of Approximately Optimal Auctions60 cited
  • 2012Budget Feasible Mechanism Design: From Prior-Free to Bayesian59 cited
  • 2014Simultaneous bayesian auctions and computational complexity58 cited
  • 2014Optimal Design for Multi-Item Auctions: A Robust Optimization Approach58 cited
  • 2011Envy, truth, and profit51 cited