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Antitrust Penalties and the Implications of Empirical Evidence on Cartel Overcharges
16 references·1 citing·36 second hop
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References

  • 1968Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach13,984 cited
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  • 2006Cartel overcharges: Survey and meta-analysis204 cited
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  • 2007The Political Economy of Antitrust98 cited
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  • 2007Cartel Overcharges and Optimal Cartel Fines75 cited
  • 2013The Distortive Effects of Antitrust Fines Based on Revenue69 cited
  • 2006The Size of Cartel Overcharges: Implications for U.S. and EU Fining Policies66 cited
  • 2007Chapter 4 Optimal Fines in the Era of Whistleblowers. Should Price Fixers still Go to Prison?53 cited
  • 2010Question: What Is the Real and Proper Antitrust Welfare Standard? Answer: The True Consumer Welfare Standard

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  • 2018Does enforcement deter cartels? A tale of two tails52 cited