The Political Economy of Antitrust

Abstract

This book brings together contributions by leading academic researchers in the areas of political-economy, cartels, merger and non-merger enforcement, as well as economists working with antitrust authorities in the U.S. and E.U., to make a timely contribution for researchers and practitioners. The chapters in this volume cover the full range of topics: enforcement of cartels; merger control; monopolization and abuse of dominance; and systemic issues in antitrust enforcement and policy. Since the last few years have seen significant changes in both the U.S. and E.U. in the attitudes towards cartels, the book places emphasis on antitrust enforcement of cartels, including topics such as the corporate leniency programs that have recently been introduced in the U.S. and E.U., optimal deterrence mechanisms against cartels and detection of cartels.

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