POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC DETERMINANTS OF INTEREST RATE BEHAVIOR: ARE CENTRAL BANKS DIFFERENT?

David R. Johnson · Pierre L. Siklos

18 citations0/0 files storedEconomic Inquiry

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Monetary Policy and Economic Impact Global Financial Crisis and Policies Fiscal Policies and Political Economy

Abstract

Political influences on short‐term interest rates in seventeen OECD countries from 1960–1990 are measured. After controlling for unexpected changes in inflation and unemployment, as well as changes in the world interest rate, short‐term interest rates in most countries do not respond to political events, neither the timing of elections nor changes in the governing party. Thus, on this criterion, the central banks in this sample do not reveal large differences in their degree of independence from political influence. The small differences are not closely related to rankings of central bank independence based on quantification of central bank laws.

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References

1975The Political Business Cycle 1983Rules, discretion and reputation in a model of monetary policy 1977Political Parties and Macroeconomic Policy 1989The federal funds rate and the channels of monetary transmission 1983A Positive Theory of Monetary Policy in a Natural Rate Model 1993Central Bank Independence and Macroeconomic Performance: Some Comparative Evidence 1992Measuring the Independence of Central Banks and Its Effect on Policy Outcomes 1991Political and Monetary Institutions and Public Financial Policies in the Industrial Countries

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