Optimal Auction Design and Equilibrium Selection in Sponsored Search Auctions

Benjamin Edelman · Michael H. Schwarz

122 citations0/0 files storedAmerican Economic Review

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Auction Theory and Applications Game Theory and Voting Systems Game Theory and Applications

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Optimal Auction Design and Equilibrium Selection in Sponsored Search Auctions by Benjamin Edelman and Michael Schwarz. Published in volume 100, issue 2, pages 597-602 of American Economic Review, May 2010

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1981Optimal Auction Design 2007Internet Advertising and the Generalized Second-Price Auction: Selling Billions of Dollars Worth of Keywords 2006Position auctions 2009Position Auctions with Consumer Search 2011Reserve prices in internet advertising auctions 2007Sponsored Search Auctions 2007Greedy bidding strategies for keyword auctions 2015What Makes Them Click: Empirical Analysis of Consumer Demand for Search Advertising

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2023Reserve Prices in Internet Advertising Auctions: A Field Experiment 2011On the efficiency of equilibria in generalized second price auctions 2012On revenue in the generalized second price auction 2011Hybrid Advertising Auctions 2014Bounding the inefficiency of outcomes in generalized second price auctions 2015In Google we trust?2015

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