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Replacement Cost Endorsement and Opportunistic Fraud in Automobile Insurance
11 references·3 citing·36 second hop
Replacement Cost Endorsement and Opportunistic Fraud in Automobile Insurance (2002)Replacement Cost Endorsement and Opportun…Economic Analysis of Insurance Fraud (2013)Economic Analysis of Insuranc…Testing for Evidence of Adverse Selection in the Automobile Insurance Market: A Comment (2001)Testing for Evidence of Adver…Testing for Asymmetric Information in Insurance Markets (2000)Testing for Asymmetric Inform…Is Honesty the Best Policy? Curtailing Insurance Fraud through Optimal Incentive Contracts (1998)Is Honesty the Best Policy? C…Hardball and the soft touch: The economics of optimal insurance contracts with costly state verification and endogenous monitoring costs (1997)Hardball and the soft touch: …Moral hazard in insurance claiming: Evidence from automobile insurance (1996)Moral hazard in insurance cla…Increasing claims for soft tissue injuries in workers' compensation: Cost shifting and moral hazard (1996)Increasing claims for soft ti…Auditing claims in the insurance market with fraud: The credibility issue (1996)Auditing claims in the insura…Evidence on Adverse Selection: Equilibrium Signaling and Cross-Subsidization in the Insurance Market (1994)Evidence on Adverse Selection…Substitution between unemployment insurance and workers' compensation (1992)Substitution between unemploy…Workers' Compensation and Moral Hazard (1991)Workers' Compensation and Mor…Causes, effects and deterrence of insurance fraud: evidence from Ghana (2016)Causes, effects and deterrenc…Understanding the roles of loss-premium comparisons and insurance coverage in customer acceptance of insurance claim frauds (2014)Understanding the roles of lo…Moral, Social, and Economic Dimensions of Insurance Claims Fraud (2008)Moral, Social, and Economic D…Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach (1968)Essays in the Theory of Risk-Bearing. (1972)Moral Hazard and Observability (1979)The Microeconomics of Insurance (2008)Equilibrium in Competitive Insurance Markets: An Essay on the Economics of Imperfect Information (1976)A model of insurance markets with incomplete information (1977)Optimal Auditing, Insurance, and Redistribution (1989)Modelling different types of automobile insurance fraud behaviour in the Spanish market (1999)Claims Auditing in Automobile Insurance: Fraud Detection and Deterrence Objectives (2002)Insurance Fraud: Issues and Challenges (2004)National Insurance and Absence from Work (1979)Health Insurance, Treatment and Outcomes: Using Auto Accidents as Health Shocks (2005)The Market for "Lemons": Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism (1970)Job Market Signaling (1973)Hedonic Prices and Implicit Markets: Product Differentiation in Pure Competition (1974)Asymmetric Information and Learning: Evidence from the Automobile Insurance Market (2005)Beyond Testing: Empirical Models of Insurance Markets (2010)The economics of moral hazard: comment (1982)Insurance Fraud and Optimal Claims Settlement Strategies (2002)UNCERTAINTY AND THE WELFARE ECONOMICS OF MEDICAL CARE (2003)Optimal contracts and competitive markets with costly state verification (1979)Limited liability and incentive contracting with ex-ante action choices (1990)Moral Hazard in Reinsurance Markets (2005)An Exploration in the Theory of Optimum Income Taxation (1971)Monopoly and product quality (1978)Optimal auditing for insurance fraud (2009)Limited-dependent and qualitative variables in econometrics (1983)Work Injury Compensation and the Duration of Nonwork Spells (1985)Deductible Contracts Against Fraudulent Claims: Evidence from Automobile Insurance (2001)Nordic Economic Policy Review (2011)Optimal insurance under rank‐dependent utility and incentive compatibility (2018)Incentives, Learning, and Compensation: A Theoretical and Empirical Investigation of Managerial Labor Contracts (1986)Panel Data Models: Some Recent Developments (2001)Adverse Selection in Insurance Markets: Policyholder Evidence from the U.K. Annuity Market (2004)Multiple Dimensions of Private Information: Evidence from the Long-Term Care Insurance Market (2006)Moral Hazard and Dynamic Insurance Data (2003)
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References

  • 2000Testing for Asymmetric Information in Insurance Markets1,001 cited
  • 1994Evidence on Adverse Selection: Equilibrium Signaling and Cross-Subsidization in the Insurance Market280 cited
  • 2001Testing for Evidence of Adverse Selection in the Automobile Insurance Market: A Comment245 cited
  • 1998Is Honesty the Best Policy? Curtailing Insurance Fraud through Optimal Incentive Contracts196 cited
  • 1996Auditing claims in the insurance market with fraud: The credibility issue180 cited
  • 1991Workers' Compensation and Moral Hazard158 cited
  • 1996Moral hazard in insurance claiming: Evidence from automobile insurance155 cited
  • 1997Hardball and the soft touch: The economics of optimal insurance contracts with costly state verification and endogenous monitoring costs125 cited
  • 2013Economic Analysis of Insurance Fraud91 cited
  • 1996Increasing claims for soft tissue injuries in workers' compensation: Cost shifting and moral hazard80 cited
  • 1992Substitution between unemployment insurance and workers' compensation58 cited

Cited by

  • 2016Causes, effects and deterrence of insurance fraud: evidence from Ghana68 cited
  • 2008Moral, Social, and Economic Dimensions of Insurance Claims Fraud68 cited
  • 2014Understanding the roles of loss-premium comparisons and insurance coverage in customer acceptance of insurance claim frauds

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8 cited