Liberalization, flexibility and industrial relations institutions: evidence from Italian and Greek banking

Abstract

The article seeks to explain how institutions change within varieties of capitalism, focusing on an important institution for the world of work: wage bargaining. Although there is a widespread expectation that liberalization and firms’ needs for flexibility brings convergence to the liberal market model of decentralized industrial relations, recent literature suggests that diversity persists and that there are a range of different responses. This article contributes to the debate by applying a coalitional perspective to highlight the factors that influence divergent trajectories of change in wage bargaining. The case studies of Italian and Greek banking suggest that the existence of ‘employer associability’ may moderate decentralizing tendencies and facilitate the reform of industrial relations institutions, while ‘labour–state coalitions’ are critical for the survival of institutions. Finally, the article discusses the findings in relation to wider debates in the comparative political economy of work.

Cite this work

No public copy is stored for this record, so only the metadata is cited.

Stored only when both papers are in the corpus — 17 citations exist upstream.

Papers that cite the same references — the relational fallback while embeddings are still backfilling.