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Modest deontologism in epistemology
13 references·7 citing·34 second hop
Modest deontologism in epistemology (2007)Modest deontologism in epistemologyVoluntary Belief and Epistemic Evaluation (2019)Voluntary Belief and Epistemi…Is Rationality Normative? (2007)Is Rationality Normative?Doxastic freedom (2007)Doxastic freedomEvidentialism: Essays in Epistemology (2004)Evidentialism: Essays in Epis…Evidentialism (2004)EvidentialismDoxastic Compatibilism and the Ethics of Belief (2003)Doxastic Compatibilism and th…The Rationality of Belief and Some Other Propositional Attitudes (2002)The Rationality of Belief and…Voluntary Belief and Epistemic Evaluation (2001)Voluntary Belief and Epistemi…Knowledge, Truth, and Duty (2001)Knowledge, Truth, and DutyThe Ethics of Belief (2000)The Ethics of BeliefDoxastic Voluntarism and Epistemic Deontology (2000)Doxastic Voluntarism and Epis…The Cambridge dictionary of philosophy (1996)The Cambridge dictionary of p…Warrant and Proper Function (1993)Warrant and Proper FunctionBelief, Agency, and Knowledge (2022)Belief, Agency, and KnowledgeThe Epistemology of Meat-Eating (2020)The Epistemology of Meat-Eati…Reasons for Belief and Normativity (2018)Reasons for Belief and Normat…Choosing and refusing: doxastic voluntarism and folk psychology (2017)Choosing and refusing: doxast…Responsible belief and epistemic justification (2016)Responsible belief and episte…Against Doxastic Compatibilism (2013)Against Doxastic CompatibilismPragmatic Encroachment and Belief‐Desire Psychology (2012)Pragmatic Encroachment and Be…A theory of justice original editionA BEHAVIORAL MODEL OF RATIONAL CHOICE (1955)The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (1963)Believing for Practical Reasons (2018)Equal treatment for belief (2018)Evidentialism and Moral Encroachment (2018)A Treatise of Human Nature (1739)Dispositional Theories of Value (1989)Internal and External Reasons (2008)The Myth of Practical Consistency (2008)VALUE RELATIONS REVISITED (2012)What You’re Rationally Required to Do and What You Ought to Do (Are the Same Thing!) (2016)Communication Theory as a Field (1999)Competitive advantage: logical and philosophical considerations (2001)Life designing: A paradigm for career construction in the 21st century (2009)Justification without Awareness (2006)Responsibility for believing (2006)Justification and the Truth-Connection (2012)Epistemic Deontology and Voluntariness (2011)Epistemic Normativity and Cognitive Agency (2016)Belief and credence: why the attitude-type matters (2018)Why epistemologists are so down on their luck (2006)Epistemic Normativity (2009)Curiosity was Framed* (2010)Can We Believe the Error Theory? (2013)Epistemic Norms and Epistemic Accountability (2018)The wrongs of racist beliefs (2018)On the Relationship between Propositional and Doxastic Justification (2010)Epistemic Teleology and the Separateness of Propositions (2013)THE REJECTION OF EPISTEMIC CONSEQUENTIALISM (2013)Epistemic Explanations (2021)Knowledge in a Social World (1999)Moral Realism (2003)Epistemic Luck (2005)
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References

  • 1993Warrant and Proper Function1,703 cited
  • 1996The Cambridge dictionary of philosophy1,182 cited
  • 2004Evidentialism586 cited
  • 2000The Ethics of Belief506 cited
  • 2004Evidentialism: Essays in Epistemology406 cited
  • 2001Knowledge, Truth, and Duty197 cited
  • 2000Doxastic Voluntarism and Epistemic Deontology178 cited
  • 2002The Rationality of Belief and Some Other Propositional Attitudes176 cited
  • 2007Is Rationality Normative?133 cited
  • 2003Doxastic Compatibilism and the Ethics of Belief125 cited
  • 2007Doxastic freedom103 cited
  • 2001Voluntary Belief and Epistemic Evaluation74 cited
  • 2019Voluntary Belief and Epistemic Evaluation67 cited

Cited by

  • 2017Choosing and refusing: doxastic voluntarism and folk psychology46 cited
  • 2022Belief, Agency, and Knowledge46 cited
  • 2018Reasons for Belief and Normativity32 cited
  • 2012Pragmatic Encroachment and Belief‐Desire Psychology

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27 cited
  • 2016Responsible belief and epistemic justification24 cited
  • 2013Against Doxastic Compatibilism23 cited
  • 2020The Epistemology of Meat-Eating21 cited