International organization and the theory of property rights

John A. C. Conybeare

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International Relations and Foreign Policy Economic Theory and Institutions Globalization and political ideologies

Abstract

A specter haunts the world's bureaucrats: the specter of small government. Skepticism about the expanding role of government in most industrial nations has encouraged political economists to go back to some fundamental questions about what we really need government to do for us, whether it be for reasons of efficiency or equity. The aim of this paper is to suggest that some of the theories attacking “big” government are equally applicable in the realm of international organization (IO).

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References

1960The Problem of Social Cost 1965The Logic of Collective Action 1966The Logic of Collective Action.1975Anarchy, State, and Utopia 2018Anarchy, State, and Utopia 1971Bureaucracy and Representative Government 1933The Economics of Welfare 1974Toward a Theory of Property Rights

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1991The limits of international organization: systematic failure in the management of international relations 2000Member states and the European Commission: theoretical insights from the new economics of organization 2013Multilateralism, Bilateralism, and Regime Design

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