Partisan Manipulation of the Economy: Another Look at Monetary Policy with Moving Regression

Abstract

This research addresses a paradox: While there appears to be a significant partisan effect on economic outcomes, there is little or no persuasive evidence of partisan differences in the manipulation of policy instruments. This paradox appears to result from uncertainties about the specification of reaction functions for policy instruments. One implication of these uncertainties is that studies of policy instruments are biased against finding partisan differences. The proposed remedy for this situation is further empirical and theoretical work that could improve reaction function specifications. An example of this is moving regression. Results presented here from moving regressions are consistent with a model of partisan policy that does not involve large average differences in policy instruments.

Cite this work

No public copy is stored for this record, so only the metadata is cited.

Stored only when both papers are in the corpus — 24 citations exist upstream.

Papers that cite the same references — the relational fallback while embeddings are still backfilling.