Comparative Bayesian Confirmation and the Quine–Duhem Problem: A Rejoinder to Strevens

Branden Fitelson

9 citations0/0 files storedThe British Journal for the Philosophy of Science

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Philosophy and History of Science Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics Philosophy, Science, and History

Abstract

By and large, we think (Strevens's [2005]) is a useful reply to our original critique (Fitelson and Waterman [2005]) of his article on the Quine–Duhem (QD) problem (Strevens [2001]). But, we remain unsatisfied with several aspects of his reply (and his original article). Ultimately, we do not think he properly addresses our most important worries. In this brief rejoinder, we explain our remaining worries, and we issue a revised challenge for Strevens's approach to QD. 1. Strevens's ‘clarifications’2. Strevens's new-and-improved ‘negligibility arguments’

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References

1990Scientific reasoning: the Bayesian approach 1954Degree of Confirmation 2001The Bayesian Treatment of Auxiliary Hypotheses 2005Bayesian Confirmation and Auxiliary Hypotheses Revisited: A Reply to Strevens 2005The Bayesian Treatment of Auxiliary Hypotheses: Reply to Fitelson and Waterman

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