Bayesian Confirmation and Auxiliary Hypotheses Revisited: A Reply to Strevens

Abstract

Michael Strevens ([2001]) has proposed an interesting and novel Bayesian analysis of the Quine-Duhem (Q–D) problem (i.e., the problem of auxiliary hypotheses). Strevens's analysis involves the use of a simplifying idealization concerning the original Q–D problem. We will show that this idealization is far stronger than it might appear. Indeed, we argue that Strevens's idealization oversimplifies the Q–D problem, and we propose a diagnosis of the source(s) of the oversimplification. 1. Some background on Quine–Duhem2. Strevens's simplifying idealization3. Indications that (I) oversimplifies Q–D4. Strevens's argument for the legitimacy of(I)

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